Recital 108

Commission proposal 21 January 2026 · COM(2026) 16 final

  1. (108)

    Any burden imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can influence decisions about whether to seek and put into use radio spectrum resources. National competent authorities should therefore set reserve prices in a way that leads to the efficient assignment of those rights, irrespective of the type of selection procedure used. The Commission may issue a recommendation on a common methodology for defining reserve prices, considering criteria such as the opportunity cost of radio spectrum, the characteristics of the band and the costs associated with the fulfilment of authorisation conditions imposed to further policy objectives. In doing so, the competitive situation of the market concerned including the possible alternative uses of the resources should also be considered. In principle, national competent authorities should not set reserve prices where they impose coverage or quality of service obligations, unless there is a risk of collusion and/or non-serious participation unduly lengthening the procedure, etc. The Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts, if the recommendation is not successful to ensure consistent outcomes in the Union and this jeopardises the ubiquitous deployment of high quality wireless networks in the Union.

Parliament amendments

ITRE draft report 20 October 2026

  1. 66 Alternative Michał KoboskoRapporteur · ITRE “Any burden imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can influence decisions about whether to seek and put into use radio spectrum…” Recital 108

    Text proposed by the Commission

    (108)Any burden imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can influence decisions about whether to seek and put into use radio spectrum resources. National competent authorities should therefore set reserve prices in a way that leads to the efficient assignment of those rights, irrespective of the type of selection procedure used. The Commission may issue a recommendation on a common methodology for defining reserve prices, considering criteria such as the opportunity cost of radio spectrum, the characteristics of the band and the costs associated with the fulfilment of authorisation conditions imposed to further policy objectives. In doing so, the competitive situation of the market concerned including the possible alternative uses of the resources should also be considered. In principle, national competent authorities should not set reserve prices where they impose coverage or quality of service obligations, unless there is a risk of collusion and/or non-serious participation unduly lengthening the procedure, etc. The Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts, if the recommendation is not successful to ensure consistent outcomes in the Union and this jeopardises the ubiquitous deployment of high quality wireless networks in the Union.

    Amendment

    (108)Any burden imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can influence decisions about whether to seek and put into use radio spectrum resources. National competent authorities should therefore set reserve prices in a way that leads to the efficient assignment of those rights, irrespective of the type of selection procedure used, taking into account the costs entailed by the conditions attached to those rights and the impact of the reserve price level on investment incentives and network deployment. The Commission should lay down, by means of a delegated act supplementing this Regulation, a common European methodology for defining reserve prices, considering criteria such as the opportunity cost of radio spectrum, the characteristics of the band and the costs associated with the fulfilment of authorisation conditions imposed to further policy objectives. In doing so, the competitive situation of the market concerned including the possible alternative uses of the resources should also be considered. In principle, national competent authorities should not set reserve prices where they impose coverage or quality of service obligations, unless there is a risk of collusion and/or non-serious participation unduly lengthening the procedure, etc. The Commission should control the application of that methodology in the radio spectrum single market procedure and should be empowered to set, by means of implementing acts, maximum annual fees or reserve prices where the application of the methodology by national competent authorities proves insufficient to set reserve prices at a level that does not disincentivise investments.

    Rapporteur
    Michał Kobosko
    Group
    Rapporteur
    Document
    ITRE draft report
    Printed header
    Recital 108