Recital 101

Commission proposal 21 January 2026 · COM(2026) 16 final

  1. (101)

    Investment predictability can hence be better achieved by the provision of rights with indefinite duration, which national competent authorities should have the possibility to subject to periodic reviews, with credible revocation options administered by the competent authorities, including the national competition authorities. At the same time, indefinite duration facilitates the development of a functioning secondary market for radio spectrum trading and leasing. The risk that indefinite duration of rights of use would prevent market entry and reduce competition, availability, quality of services, and investment incentives should however be addressed through strong and credible regulatory safeguards that protect competition and prevent radio spectrum hoarding, such as obligations to provide wholesale access or enable radio spectrum sharing subject to compliance with competition law. By choosing appropriate authorisation conditions - such as ‘use-it-or-share-it’ or ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions and rollout obligations - and by enforcing them, the national competent authorities are able to ensure that radio spectrum is not left idle or blocked and is made available to more efficient or innovative competitors. Considering the importance of technical innovation, national competent authorities should be able to provide for rights to use radio spectrum for experimental purposes, including in scientific research projects and experimentations conducted in the lifecycle of the projects funded in the scope of the EU programmes, subject to specific restrictions and conditions, including duration, strictly justified by the experimental nature of such rights.

Parliament amendments

ITRE draft report 20 October 2026

  1. 62 Alternative Michał KoboskoRapporteur · ITRE “Investment predictability can hence be better achieved by the provision of rights with indefinite duration, which should be subject to periodic…” Recital 101

    Text proposed by the Commission

    (101)Investment predictability can hence be better achieved by the provision of rights with indefinite duration, which national competent authorities should have the possibility to subject to periodic reviews, with credible revocation options administered by the competent authorities, including the national competition authorities. At the same time, indefinite duration facilitates the development of a functioning secondary market for radio spectrum trading and leasing. The risk that indefinite duration of rights of use would prevent market entry and reduce competition, availability, quality of services, and investment incentives should however be addressed through strong and credible regulatory safeguards that protect competition and prevent radio spectrum hoarding, such as obligations to provide wholesale access or enable radio spectrum sharing subject to compliance with competition law. By choosing appropriate authorisation conditions - such as ‘use-it-or-share-it’ or ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions and rollout obligations - and by enforcing them, the national competent authorities are able to ensure that radio spectrum is not left idle or blocked and is made available to more efficient or innovative competitors. Considering the importance of technical innovation, national competent authorities should be able to provide for rights to use radio spectrum for experimental purposes, including in scientific research projects and experimentations conducted in the lifecycle of the projects funded in the scope of the EU programmes, subject to specific restrictions and conditions, including duration, strictly justified by the experimental nature of such rights.

    Amendment

    (101)Investment predictability can hence be better achieved by the provision of rights with indefinite duration, which should be subject to periodic reviews by national competent authorities, covering coverage and quality of service obligations and the state of competition, accompanied by a market analysis and carried out not earlier than 20 years after the granting of the right and thereafter not earlier than every 15 years, with credible revocation options administered by the competent authorities, including the national competition authorities. At the same time, indefinite duration facilitates the development of a functioning secondary market for radio spectrum trading and leasing. The risk that indefinite duration of rights of use would prevent market entry and reduce competition, availability, quality of services, and investment incentives should however be addressed through strong and credible regulatory safeguards that protect competition and prevent radio spectrum hoarding, such as obligations to provide wholesale access or enable radio spectrum sharing subject to compliance with competition law. By choosing appropriate authorisation conditions - such as ‘use-it-or-share-it’ or ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions and rollout obligations - and by enforcing them, the national competent authorities are able to ensure that radio spectrum is not left idle or blocked and is made available to more efficient or innovative competitors. Considering the importance of technical innovation, national competent authorities should be able to provide for rights to use radio spectrum for experimental purposes, including in scientific research projects and experimentations conducted in the lifecycle of the projects funded in the scope of the EU programmes, subject to specific restrictions and conditions, including duration, strictly justified by the experimental nature of such rights.

    Rapporteur
    Michał Kobosko
    Group
    Rapporteur
    Document
    ITRE draft report
    Printed header
    Recital 101