ITRE Amendment 111
Recital 211
111 ~Alternative Michał KoboskoRapporteur · ITRE “The pricing of access to newly built civil-engineering infrastructure of the undertakings designated as having significant market power for the…” Recital 211
Text proposed by the Commission
(211)The pricing of access to newly built civil-engineering infrastructure of the undertakings designated as having significant market power for the deployment of gigabit networks by alternative operators could have an impact on the SMP operator’s incentives to build new civil-engineering infrastructure with sufficient capacity to host alternative networks. The price for access to the newly built civil-engineering infrastructure should reflect current market conditions and should be based on the full actual costs incurred by the SMP operator, as long as strict non-discrimination is ensured in the terms and conditions of access to such infrastructure. Such an approach would provide the right incentives for investing in new civil-engineering infrastructure. Moreover, depending on market circumstances, building significant new civil-engineering infrastructure may represent for the SMP operator a risk-investment profile higher than the risk profile associated with the reuse of legacy civil-engineering infrastructure. That risk profile would involve risks in terms of incurred costs and in terms of expected revenues, which should be assessed by the NRAs. However, where equivalence of access obligation (equivalence of input or output) is effectively implemented and there is a proven retail market price constraint, complemented by economic replicability of downstream products, national regulatory authorities should in principle refrain from imposing regulated prices. Such obligations should consist, for instance, of technical and economic replicability tests, combined with monitoring mechanisms. The retail market price constraint could arise from infrastructural competition, clear commitments made by alternative providers to deploy gigabit networks in underserved areas as resulting from geographical surveys, and regulated anchor products subject to cost orientation. Where a national regulatory authority imposes obligations to implement a cost-accounting system in order to support price controls, it should be able to undertake an annual audit to ensure compliance with that cost-accounting system, provided that it has the necessary qualified staff, or to require such an audit to be carried out by another qualified body, independent of the undertaking concerned. The charging system in the Union for wholesale voice call termination is based on Calling Party Network Pays. An analysis of demand and supply substitutability shows that currently or in the foreseeable future, there are no substitutes at wholesale level which might constrain the setting of charges for termination in a given network. Taking into account the two-way access nature of termination markets, further potential competition problems include cross-subsidisation between operators. Those potential competition problems are common to both fixed and mobile voice call termination markets. Therefore, in light of the ability and incentives of terminating operators to raise prices substantially above cost, cost orientation is considered to be the most appropriate intervention to address this concern over the medium term. Future market developments may alter the dynamics of those markets to the extent that regulation would no longer be necessary.
Amendment
(211)The pricing of access to newly built civil-engineering infrastructure of the undertakings designated as having significant market power for the deployment of very high capacity networks by alternative operators could have an impact on the SMP operator’s incentives to build new civil-engineering infrastructure with sufficient capacity to host alternative networks. The price for access to the newly built civil-engineering infrastructure should reflect current market conditions and should be based on the full actual costs incurred by the SMP operator, as long as strict non-discrimination is ensured in the terms and conditions of access to such infrastructure. Such an approach would provide the right incentives for investing in new civil-engineering infrastructure. Moreover, depending on market circumstances, building significant new civil-engineering infrastructure may represent for the SMP operator a risk-investment profile higher than the risk profile associated with the reuse of legacy civil-engineering infrastructure. That risk profile would involve risks in terms of incurred costs and in terms of expected revenues, which should be assessed by the NRAs. However, where equivalence of access obligation (equivalence of input or output) is effectively implemented and there is a proven retail market price constraint, complemented by economic replicability of downstream products, national regulatory authorities should in principle refrain from imposing regulated prices. Such obligations should consist, for instance, of technical and economic replicability tests, combined with monitoring mechanisms. The retail market price constraint could arise from infrastructural competition, clear commitments made by alternative providers to deploy very high capacity networks in underserved areas as resulting from geographical surveys, and regulated anchor products subject to cost orientation. Where a national regulatory authority imposes obligations to implement a cost-accounting system in order to support price controls, it should be able to undertake an annual audit to ensure compliance with that cost-accounting system, provided that it has the necessary qualified staff, or to require such an audit to be carried out by another qualified body, independent of the undertaking concerned. The charging system in the Union for wholesale voice call termination is based on Calling Party Network Pays. An analysis of demand and supply substitutability shows that currently or in the foreseeable future, there are no substitutes at wholesale level which might constrain the setting of charges for termination in a given network. Taking into account the two-way access nature of termination markets, further potential competition problems include cross-subsidisation between operators. Those potential competition problems are common to both fixed and mobile voice call termination markets. Therefore, in light of the ability and incentives of terminating operators to raise prices substantially above cost, cost orientation is considered to be the most appropriate intervention to address this concern over the medium term. Future market developments may alter the dynamics of those markets to the extent that regulation would no longer be necessary.
- Rapporteur
- Michał Kobosko
- Group
- Rapporteur
- Targets
- Recital 211
- Document
- ITRE draft report
- Printed header
- Recital 211
Cite
Amendment 111 (draft report by Michał Kobosko), European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, draft report on COM(2026) 16 (ITRE-PR-791994, PE791.994v02-00, 20 October 2026), pp. 94–96
https://research.eutechreg.com/trackers/digital-networks-act/amendments/itre-111/