ITRE Amendment 106
Recital 205
106 ~Alternative Michał KoboskoRapporteur · ITRE “Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance…” Recital 205
Text proposed by the Commission
(205)Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of services. Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of competing services. Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a particular market reveals ineffective competition. In particular, undertakings designated as having significant market power should avoid a price squeeze whereby the difference between their retail prices and the interconnection or access prices charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to ensure sustainable competition. When a national regulatory authority calculates costs incurred in establishing a service mandated under this Regulation, it is appropriate to allow a reasonable return on the capital employed by the operators having significant market power, including appropriate labour and building costs, with the value of capital adjusted where necessary to reflect the current valuation of assets and efficiency of operations. The method of cost recovery should be appropriate to the circumstances taking account of the need to promote efficiency, sustainable competition and deployment of gigabit networks and should take in account gigabit connectivity. National regulatory authorities should be able to decide to maintain or not to impose regulated wholesale access prices on next-generation networks if sufficient competition safeguards are present. More specifically, to prevent excessive prices in markets where there are undertakings designated as having significant market power, pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-discrimination obligations, measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both. Those competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by national regulatory authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the undertaking designated as having significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the competitive level or where lower population density reduces the incentives for the development of gigabit networks and the national regulatory authority establishes that effective and non-discriminatory access is ensured through obligations imposed.
Amendment
(205)Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of services. Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of competing services. Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a particular market reveals ineffective competition. In particular, undertakings designated as having significant market power should avoid a price squeeze whereby the difference between their retail prices and the interconnection or access prices charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to ensure sustainable competition. When a national regulatory authority calculates costs incurred in establishing a service mandated under this Regulation, it is appropriate to allow a reasonable return on the capital employed by the operators having significant market power, including appropriate labour and building costs, with the value of capital adjusted where necessary to reflect the current valuation of assets and efficiency of operations. The method of cost recovery should be appropriate to the circumstances taking account of the need to promote efficiency, long-term competition and deployment of very high capacity networks. National regulatory authorities should be able to decide to maintain or not to impose regulated wholesale access prices on next-generation networks if sufficient competition safeguards are present. More specifically, to prevent excessive prices in markets where there are undertakings designated as having significant market power, pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-discrimination obligations, measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both. Those competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by national regulatory authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the undertaking designated as having significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the competitive level or where lower population density reduces the incentives for the development of very high capacity networks and the national regulatory authority establishes that effective and non-discriminatory access is ensured through obligations imposed.
- Rapporteur
- Michał Kobosko
- Group
- Rapporteur
- Targets
- Recital 205
- Document
- ITRE draft report
- Printed header
- Recital 205
Cite
Amendment 106 (draft report by Michał Kobosko), European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, draft report on COM(2026) 16 (ITRE-PR-791994, PE791.994v02-00, 20 October 2026), pp. 89–91
https://research.eutechreg.com/trackers/digital-networks-act/amendments/itre-106/