Amendment 141· Digital Omnibus proposal Recital 12
~Alternative
Text of the amendment
As tabled
Wordingagainst the Commission’s
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Struck CommissionHighlighted amendment
Target
Wording of the targeted provisionlaw in force, Commission proposal, latest Council text
Commission proposalCOM(2025) 837
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Council text of 22 October 2026ST 14756/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear and proportionate.
Cite this amendment
Amendment 141 (Damian Boeselager), European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, amendments 79–250 to the draft report on COM(2025) 837 (CJ72-AM-786820, PE786.820v01-00, 27 July 2026), pp. 59–60
Link, short form and official text
Amendment 141 (Damian Boeselager), European Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, amendments 79–250 to the draft report on COM(2025) 837 (CJ72-AM-786820, PE786.820v01-00, 27 July 2026), pp. 59–60
ITRE–LIBE Amendment 141 (CJ72-AM-786820), p. 59