Compare the available Commission, Council and Parliament texts and amendments affecting this recital.
Recital total: 1 part · 3 Council drafts · 9 Parliament amendments
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European Commission proposal
The wording proposed by the Commission at the start of this legislative file.
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Recital 12
Commission proposal
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Institutional text
Council Presidency texts
Successive Presidency compromise texts. Their inclusion does not imply agreement or adoption.
No Council wording is mapped to this tracked part.
Recital 12
June Presidency compromise · 10 June
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
June Presidency compromise · 18 June
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
September Presidency compromise
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12 3 Council drafts
Recital 12
10 June 2026 · June Presidency compromise · 10 June
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
18 June 2026 · June Presidency compromise · 18 June
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
3 September 2026 · September Presidency compromise
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Competing proposals
European Parliament amendments
These are alternative tabled amendments. An amendment affecting several tracked parts appears once here, with each target identified.
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(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Remove proposed wordingAmendment 86 · Emil Radev JURI
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Remove proposed wordingAmendment 87 · David Cormand JURI
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Remove proposed wordingAmendment 139 · João Oliveira ITRE · LIBE
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Justification
There are no grounds or substantial evidence – whether divulged by the Commission or available in the public domain – to justify the introduction of these measures, which provide much broader and much more subjective scope to refuse data-sharing requests from data subjects or third parties.
Remove proposed wordingAmendment 140 · Elena Sancho Murillo, Marina Kaljurand, Brando Benifei, José Cepeda, Lina Gálvez, Francisco Assis, Alex Agius Saliba ITRE · LIBE
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Alternative wordingAmendment 141 · Damian Boeselager on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group ITRE · LIBE
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Alternative wordingAmendment 142 · Markus Buchheit ITRE · LIBE
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary,effectively available to data holders and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders shouldmust not be requiredneutralised by disproportionate substantiation or documentation burdens. Where serious doubts exist as to the protection of trade secrets, the actual enforceability of the law, or the independence of the relevant authorities or courts, the data holder must be able to refuse disclosure. No obligation should arise to conduct ain-depthfull-scaleanalysesanalysisof foreign legal systems or demonstrationtoofprovidethecomprehensivelevel of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entityevidence as a precondition to be able to substantiate theirfor refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Remove proposed wordingAmendment 143 · David Cormand on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group IMCO
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
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Recital 12
European Commission proposal → Council Presidency text · ST 10426/26
Changes in context
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
European Commission proposal
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Council Presidency text · ST 10426/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
Council Presidency text · ST 10426/26 → Council Presidency text · ST 10677/26
Changes in context
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Council Presidency text · ST 10426/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Council Presidency text · ST 10677/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
Council Presidency text · ST 10677/26 → Council Presidency text · ST 12535/26
Changes in context
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Council Presidency text · ST 10677/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Council Presidency text · ST 12535/26
The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals 10 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across entities of an entire third country.
Recital 12
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 139 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report: removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 139 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report: removal
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 140 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report: removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 140 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report: removal
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 141 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 141 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 142 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary,effectively available to data holders and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders shouldmust not be requiredneutralised by disproportionate substantiation or documentation burdens. Where serious doubts exist as to the protection of trade secrets, the actual enforceability of the law, or the independence of the relevant authorities or courts, the data holder must be able to refuse disclosure. No obligation should arise to conduct ain-depthfull-scaleanalysesanalysisof foreign legal systems or demonstrationtoofprovidethecomprehensivelevel of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entityevidence as a precondition to be able to substantiate theirfor refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 142 · ITRE–LIBE amendments 79–250 to the draft report
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain effectively available to data holders and must not be neutralised by disproportionate substantiation or documentation burdens. Where serious doubts exist as to the protection of trade secrets, the actual enforceability of the law, or the independence of the relevant authorities or courts, the data holder must be able to refuse disclosure. No obligation should arise to conduct in-depth analyses of foreign legal systems or to provide comprehensive evidence as a precondition for refusal.
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 143 · IMCO amendments 125–328 to the draft opinion: removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 143 · IMCO amendments 125–328 to the draft opinion: removal
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 9 · IMCO draft opinion · Alex Agius Saliba (rapporteur): removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 86 · JURI amendments 69–296 to the draft opinion: removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 86 · JURI amendments 69–296 to the draft opinion: removal
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 87 · JURI amendments 69–296 to the draft opinion: removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
Amendment 87 · JURI amendments 69–296 to the draft opinion: removal
Wording reproduced in the amendment → Amendment 3 · JURI draft opinion · Brando Benifei (rapporteur): removal
Changes in context
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
RemovedAdded
Both texts in full
Wording reproduced in the amendment
(12) The activation of the refusal mechanism should remain voluntary, and the demonstration done only upon its activation. Data holders should not be required to conduct a full-scale analysis or demonstration of the level of trade secret protection in third countries or by a third country entity as a precondition to be able to substantiate their refusal to sharing data or to disclose trade secrets. In their demonstration, data holders may take into consideration various factors, such as insufficient or inadequate legal standards, poor or arbitrary enforcement, historical infringements, foreign disclosure obligations conflicting with Union law, limited legal recourse or remedies for Union entities, the strategic misuse of procedural tactics to undermine competitors, or undue political influence. Given the diverse range of entities, third countries, and data sharing scenarios involved, data holders should focus their assessment and demonstration on pertinent risks and act accordingly, including by setting appropriate safeguards or activating the refusal mechanism. Refusals should be clear, proportionate, and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being applied systematically or in a generalized manner across an entire third country.
